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SOURCES-METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2000 2006

CIC - Army  
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SUBJ: HÖFTL, Mr. Wilhelm  
OC Utzmannshuber.

1944 Feb 1948

Born in Vienna.  
Father: Johann Höftl - Finance official.  
Mother: Maria nee Renner.  
Attended elementary school, high school (Realgymnasium)  
in Vienna.  
Studied History, Germanistic and Geography at the University  
of Vienna.

1927

Doctor of Philosophy.  
Research work for the Seminary of Modern History, University  
of Vienna.

March 1938

Applied for position with the SS and accepted on tribe,  
Party and SS Leader.

Autumn 1938

Full-fledged member of the SS.  
Involvement in church affairs in the internal department of the SD-

Summer 1939

Subject to disciplinary investigation on charges of  
"Militärschulische Unverlässigkeit", and transferred to  
Foreign Department (Amt Ausland - later Amt VI).

Given the assignment of referent on the Southwest of Europe  
with the SS - Leitstabsabteilung, Vienna. Intelligence work  
direction southwest and Soviet Russia.

Received disciplinary action on the score of political un-  
reliability as evidenced by relationship with opponents of  
National Socialism and lack of "Militärschulische Freiheit".  
Punitive transfer to frontline service as combat soldier.

Despite the fact that he has holding the rank of Hauptsturmführer  
such was at that time, far reporter, publisher of a Division  
Newspaper (Divisionenzeitung Riga), in Belgrade, until  
when Kaltenthaler succeeded Höftl as chief of the T-2.  
Re-orientated by the SD and assigned to Amt VI 1 (South-East),  
Berlin, as referent VI 1 2 (Hungary), VI 1 3 (Croatia, Serbia)  
and VI 1 4 (Albania and Montenegro), also deputy chief of  
Group VI 2.

Sent to Budapest as political advisor to the plenipotentiary  
of the Reich in Hungary, responsible VI 1 2.

Offices moved from Budapest to Belgrade.

Trip to Switzerland. First contact with Allied representatives.

Second trip to Switzerland.

Third trip to Switzerland.

Surveillance to American forces at Bad Arolsen, Austria.

1. In 1933, after the Pilsudski regime had eliminated the influence  
of parliamentary institutions, the so-called "Counterrevolutionary Left"

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was activated. HUTTL, representing the philosophical faculty at the University of Vienna, became one of the leading functionaries. His one desire was to bring about a rapprochement between a diversity of groups within the studentenschaft, namely the national and the Roman-Catholic groups. At that time he came in touch with corresponding student associations in the South-East, primarily with the Roman-Catholic ones, and an interest in South-Eastern affairs began to take root.

2. In the beginning - February 1943 - his work in the VI 7 Doctor who exclusively concerned with Italy, in particular with the Vatican. HUTTL had contacts in church circles and frequently compared notes with Father LADISLUS J., the Pope's German counselor. He actively entertained the plan to seek a negotiated settlement with the Western powers through the intermediary of the Vatican, a move endorsed by the German Ambassador to the Holy See, Von Haizendorf and Dr. Gunther Holzman, Attaché present in the Foreign Office until - summer 1943 - Minister von Ribbentrop expressly forbade them to lend themselves to any efforts along these lines.

3. HUTTL was in Rome at the time of Mussolini's fall. He tried to steer German policy in the direction of dropping Mussolini, convincing Padoa-Schioppa and permitting the Italians to quit the war. This led to serious altercations with Ambassador von Mackensen. In order to silence all criticism von Ribbentrop prohibited all telephone calls from Berlin to Rome (except those authorized by Stabssekretär Stresemann). In HUTTL's case an abortive measure, because he had installed his own transmitter a few days before. For having risked to break the official German line as laid down by Hitler, HUTTL was put on Ribbentrop's blacklist. Ever since the events of September 1943, HUTTL confined his activities to the South-Eastern theater.

4. During his stay in Budapest as advisor to Ambassador Dr. Voegelmayr, HUTTL again found himself at cross-purposes with the official German policy adopted towards Hungary after her attempt to jump off the German bandwagon. In the opinion of Voegelmayr and the liaison CG und Polizeiführer S.-Generalmajor Kinkelmann the solution was to link the extreme national-socialist grouping represented by the "Volksdeutsche" lobby into the saddle. HUTTL, on the other hand, favored a moderate solution, a "burgherlike liaison", and had already brought a group of representative personalities together. When the vicarious Voegelmayre Kinkelmann prevailed and the Szalai's government installed itself, HUTTL broke off relations and from then on confined his cl to intelligence activities, preparing to break camp in Budapest.

5. In Budapest HUTTL established for the first time contact with the International Red Cross. After his return to Vienna he concentrated all his efforts upon getting into the fold all those groups which wanted and may also shared his political outlook and to organize them. His political team HUTTL sets up as follows: "He got up all efforts to lead the national-system back to the right track by democratic means (von Janisch, Horwitz) and rather to try and achieve for Austria a special position and

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preferential treatment commensurate with its historical importance by means of contacting resistance movements inside of Germany and the Eastern powers so as to bring the war as speedily as possible to an end. HUTTL and SAUERBRUNN, the Austria resistor of VI V, had been laying the groundwork ever since beginning of 1943, greatly aided by WALTER KALTENBRUNNER, who, from entirely different motives, had commissioned them to meet opposition groups inside of Germany.

6. In March 1945, HUTTL went to Zurich, Switzerland, for a conference with Prince Ausenburg, until 20 July 1944, assistant Air Attache in Bern and a prominent member of the Austrian Freedom movement, acting in behalf of Lt. Dulles. He made this trip with the acquiescence of Lt. KALTENBRUNNER, who feared that it might transpire that "he is stretching out peace feelers" and who therefore strictly enjoined HUTTL to confine himself to gathering information and to desist from making contacts of any kind. The specific mission given HUTTL was to ascertain conditions and preparations on the Allied side to ascertain the proposition of peaceful settlement. HUTTL (and in all probability KALTENBRUNNER) knew what the answer was bound to be and merely went through the motions of scurrying out his opposite numbers. Over and beyond his commission he actually offered the Eastern powers his collaboration and returned to Germany with a clearly defined mission, viz to prevent by means of sabotage and to keep the Allies posted on German plans to create a center of resistance in the Austrian and Bavarian Alps. In his report to KALTENBRUNNER, HUTTL naturally concealed what the actual results of his mission had been. He merely confirmed that a peaceful settlement was out of the question as envisaged by KALTENBRUNNER and that unconditional surrender stood. HUTTL contacted in on aside that the political interest of the Americans was in the direction of Austria, but found no response. The upshot was that KALTENBRUNNER vetoed all further trips.

7. A rapidly deteriorating military situation as well as the iniquities of Nazi and COMINT worked a change in KALTENBRUNNER's mind. Whether he actually grasped the true purpose of HUTTL's travels, is difficult to ascertain. When questioned on this point, HUTTL himself naturally answered in the affirmative, although according to HUTTL, he had not stated his revised concept by stating that he considered it inadvisable to let valuable contacts of the kind made in Switzerland lapses. At this time he conferred directly with American representatives. In his several talks with Lt. Col. Leslie May, according to HUTTL, belonging to a "Top Secret" unit who had been pluted to accompany the allied control Commission to Austria, HUTTL passed on to Lt. Col. May all the information desired, which the latter detailed in a long report. Future collaboration was discussed and the following arrangement agreed upon. HUTTL was told to stay and continue operating with his group in "the last fortress of German resistance" and striven to keep wireless contact with competent American agencies ("i.e. USA, British, Canadian, Australian, etc"). This wireless connection was to be relayed via the Swiss Military Police, represented by Lt. Col. May, Lt. Col. H. L. Jones, Lt. Col. G. C. Cole, Lt. Col. F. J. M. G. and Lt. Col. G. E. M. All these were potential in their military and political aspects ("in addition to intelligence and administrative characteristics non-political or anti"); furthermore he was to keep secret communications and pass upon allied propaganda. This is the content of

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the dimension. UNO IX. Incisive comprehensive survey of the personnel and political philosophy of his opposition groups. During his stay in Switzerland he also met up with other personalities slated to play an important role in the settlement of the Austrian question as visualized by the American representatives, many of them members of the "Freies Österreich" movement.

8. HUTTL's last trip in May 1945, took place under greatly changed conditions. Hitlerbrunner had been given plenary powers in South-Germany, Germany's military collapse became imminent and under the impact of events, HUTTL himself finally saw the light and empowered HUTTL to make contacts on his behalf, also to arrange for a formal meeting between HUTTL and Dr. WILHELM LUDWIG. Owing to the speedy advance of the French Army, which appeared in the immediate vicinity of the Austrian Swiss-Border, HUTTL only managed to get as far as Leobenstein. He met Hauptmann Dr. LUDWIG in Vaduz and proposed through him to Dr. WILHELM a meeting with President WILHELM. After a few days Dr. LUDWIG brought back the answer, that such a meeting could be arranged on principle, but President WILHELM's permission would have to be asked for. After handing over to Dr. LUDWIG all available information, it was surmised that another meeting between them should take place on the Italian-Austrian border as soon as the U.S. Government had its final disposition made known. This arrangement was superseded by military events.

9. In the meantime HUTTL had sound out all major German Army commanders through intermediaries whether they would consider discontinuing the fight at this stage. The results were encouraging, although as HUTTL himself and his subordinates declared their willingness to take matters in their own hands, provided HUTTL went alone. This was attained through concerted action on the part of Gauleiter Josef (prevailed upon by the former Secretary of State Dr. Ruhmann) and General Dr. GALLIENI, a close personal friend of Dr. HUTTL himself. The decisive moment at HUTTL's side was attained by Ambassador Dr. Fleischman as representative of the U.S. Group. Also the capitulation of Germany's Southern Army was reported by General of HUTTL's group, the famed Generalgruppenchef West (Gauleiter Dr. und Fulliusfuehrer in Italy) into burning into the inevitable.

10. HUTTL lost soldiers on May en route to his headquarters in Steyerberg, but got stuck in full Alt-Anholt due to prevailing traffic congestion caused by retreating German troops. He immediately put himself at the disposal of the Austrian authorities and was busy up to his waist in Gauleiter trouble (ulcers) the day American troops entered Alt-Anholt. As arranged with the American representatives, he immediately informed the nearest American post of his presence, asking them to notify General. A similar arrangement had been made in Steyerberg, where HUTTL's Deputy delivered a letter, written previously, to the local American Command specifying the date of the presence of a transmitter and the frequency in Steyerberg. The correctness of this document has in all its essentials until now been confirmed. There has been no attempt on the part of anybody in Dr. HUTTL's group to approach so far, to conceal anything. On the contrary, the cooperation

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offered had been spontaneous and without mutual reservation as far as facts are concerned.

11. Since February 1945, HUTTL had been in direct charge of the Mosorate Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Albania and Montenegro, when he returning from Hungary end of 1944. He also tried to bring the remaining reforate, viz., Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece under his tut. The underlying purpose of this scheme was, as HUTTL puts it, "unterstützende Verwaltung und Zusammenarbeit unter der Führung des Stellvertretenden Staatssekretärs für Auslandsangelegenheiten des Nachkriegsaufbaus an die betroffenen Stellen der Verwaltung Staates" (collaboration with respect, putting at the disposal of the members of the United States the intelligence net). Bringing all reforate of VI E into line with this policy was not too difficult a task, since all reforate-leader (with the exception of Greece, S. Hauptsturmführer Klein) were HUTTL's personal friends and now eye to eye with him in matters political ("unser in ihrer inneren politischen Entwicklung ein wichtiger Linie"). By way of implementing this scheme, HUTTL had started already in Budapest to reorganize his intelligence net in Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania and Montenegro through elimination of all those elements still in VI E and in the countries proper who could not be trusted fully to readjust themselves; this is what happened e.g. to the then leader of the reforate Albania Montenegro, SS Hauptsturmführer LEDT. ALD. I and II were told by HUTTL to follow suit by cleaning up their sections. For ALD. III this did not pose much of a problem, inasmuch as several attempts had been made by the American and also the British Military Mission in Budapest to enlist its agents for their own purposes. Beginning March 1945, already did HUTTL indicate to his agents that the inevitable military collapse of Germany would not necessarily involve a cessation of their work and that a small circle of functionaries within Mf. VI was contemplating to continue intelligence operations on behalf of the Allies, possibly even with their native support. As far as HUTTL's own reforate were concerned, viz., JUD. VI, Albania and Montenegro, he had calculated the switch with the assistance of Hauptsturmführer Przytotsky and Mandl. In particular JUD. VI had been entrusted with the task of activating central agencies in the mountainous regions of Yugoslavia and Albania with sufficient continuity (Ausstrahlungsmöglichkeit), to extend into Macedonia, Bulgaria and that part of Greece that is in dispute (adjacent to Bulgaria.)

12. In normal times all intelligence reports were collected centrally in VI E. Likewise reports from Hungary and Yugoslavia however did not come in over the main receiver (Central, Vienna later Potsdam) but were picked up by the receiver in Steyrline.

The wireless plane is to Rumania were all in a class by themselves, though up to, HUTTL's group had succeeded in persuading them by the simple means of an understanding between Mf. VI and the wireless operator in the directive that he could receive no messages of the other allies and that directives to the wireless operator in Rumania would be authorized only by the Mf. VI group. This scheme work in the successfully till, even the chief of VI E, himself, had heard of the fact that a radio station existed. When the condition was made to disband VI E (in 1945), the wireless operator in question, DTTB, was secured by Mf. VI for the

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continuation of the Rumania service along established lines. The technical part of the switch-over from transmitter to receiver had been completed when the Americans took over. At MOUNTAIN (HOTEL's deputy) already succeeded in calling Rumanian up to the time of occupation he received call-signs only. On 5 May 1945, Mountsoul told the operators to go off the air for the time being.

13. HOTEL claims that his is the only information out of Art VI that has come out of the general disorganization attending Germany's defeat basically intact. He believes that all existing nets have been disrupted beyond repair, but that some of their lines could possibly be reactivated in the course of time provided the return of Art VI and his W/T operators who will free agents. At the occasion of a meeting in Salzburg on 18 April 1945, HOTEL informed other ETO W/T men that the entire wireless system comprising Art VI with its agents abroad had been smashed. The spread of the American advance had compelled Art VI to move to its Thurau hide-out in a matter of hours. Later on 18 April 1945 had checked with other group leaders, all of whom had lost both their agents and their wireless connections (Franklinia). This ties in with HOTEL's own observation that the re-installation of the Kavallieritat (the powerful transmission system of Art VI in Lippstadt via Berlin) had not been accomplished and also the fact that during the last week prior to Germany's capitulation transmission could be made only from the so-called "Special Transmitter" police transmitters of the R.A.F. at Hohne via Lippstadt Command in North Tyrol. The other large transmission establishment of Art VI at Juelich-Bergen via Prague, HOTEL believes has been blown up. That remaining being a few small agent sets which, however, are helpless without a control station and that Agents VI and VII could reactivate one of those, given the most elementary precautions of the occupying authorities. HOTEL submits.

14. In answer to the question what possible advantages could accrue to us from taking over and continuing operations of the SD information net in the South East and whether, given those advantages, they would not make last analysis be established by the Germans to our relations with Soviet-Russia if it should transpire that no avail ourselves of an information system, planned, put up, staffed and operated by members of the former SD, HOTEL made the following statement:

From my activities in the Central Europe extending over years, I know that the American information service in West Europe are still in their embryonic stage and that, in some countries, there are none at all. On the other hand, have I been able to ascertain from various sources that the British have a well-established (Art VI standard) information net, which, even during the German occupation, has never been fully destroyed. It is least likely, will it be fully destroyed during the period of the Russian occupation. Inasmuch as the organization of an information network in Soviet Russia proper would meet with considerable difficulties, it is impossible (politically and so) to use the neighboring countries now occupied by us as being a window into Soviet-Russia (Russia). This has nothing to do with the conduct of foreign relations towards that country, because after all, every country tries to have an information authority agency in all other countries.

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The organization of such an infiltration net taking years and sometimes decades, it cannot possibly be affected by the consideration of whether the relations between the two countries concerned happen to be good or bad at any one time. As an example illustrating this contention, our good Allies, the Japanese, continued operating their intelligence service inside of Germany after Germany had declared war upon the United States; a complete set of the strategic plans of Germany's Northern armies against Russia was found in the possession of Japanese agents.

The disadvantages on the other hand of letting oneself be influenced by country-man-consideration are shown up in the example of Italy. Until the fall of Mussolini in summer 1943, a personal order from Hitler forbade active intelligence operations inside of Italy. The pay-off came when the Allies started operating in North Africa and German intelligence services learned to their chagrin that the ideal basis for intelligence operations (Nachrichtendienstliche Ausgangsstellen), viz Italy, was beyond their reach. Another example was Albania and Dalmatia, for intelligence operations between easy reach from the Western Adriatic instead the more hazardous route through territory infested by the forces of Tito and in the beginning also of Mihailovitch, had to be chosen.

Conversely, it can be gathered from those examples that each country is aware that its closest ally is operating against it in the field of Intelligence. On that score serious friction can only be avoided if a country can prove to its Ally that it is carrying on active intelligence, i.e. can trace a line that has built back to its central agency in the country of that Ally. This is an added advantage of taking over an intelligence net that is a going concern, rather than starting to build one from scratch. If the worst comes to the worst an agent can get caught and no proofs that he is working for the Americans, hardly sufficient evidence for the Russians to base an accusation upon that the Americans are operating an intelligence net. A similar practice has been adopted, I happen to know, in Turkey which is the main operation basis of American and British Information services into Soviet Russia and where the Turkish intelligence which has shown excellent results for its activities in Russia, puts its material, quite openly, at the disposal of Americans and British. That the Russians are unaware of this practice, I strongly doubt. = End quote =

15. Cryptography is a highly developed art in Art VI. One has imagined to imagine the best ciphers and decipherers, but of the senior members of the Armed Service Bureau (Generalkommando K. u. K.) was chief of the Austro-Hungarian cryptographic department in the First World War. At one expects they are considered the crown of the crew, as evidenced by the fact that the Hungarian cryptographic department which maintained the best tradition, did superior work with very restricted means at its disposal. The Hungarians had a specialised library service that monitored the cryptographic activity of the whole world. The Hungarians kept up to date a complete set of codes of Turkey, Greece, most French possessions, Abyssinia, Bulgaria (the latter available operating in behalf of British Intelligence). Furthermore a complete record was kept of all reports sent to Switzerland by the American Ambassador to Switzerland, Mr. Harrison. Some time later you be especially

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got wind of his code having been compromised and switched over to a new one, which the Hungarians also cracked in short order. MTTL did not consider the material passed on by Harrison as particularly valuable; it was throughout in a tendentious vein and ill-informed. MTTL mentioned his visit to Mr. BILLI when he visited him for the first time, pointing out that in his opinion Ambassador Harrison had relied too heavily upon Gestapo plumbs. The most valuable material the Hungarian brought to light were the reports the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow sent to Ankara quite frequently. His reports were exceptionally well informed, but that was going on inside the Franklin. MTTL doubts that these reports are known to be in full details.

16. MTTL believes that some attempt should be made to reconstruct the Hungarian cryptographic section. He thinks to have laid the groundwork for such action by having said to it that none of the key personnel left Hungary on time. He thinks that, given a free hand, he could in short order re-establish a nuclear force, beginning most of them abroad; somewhere in the Austro-Bavarian Alps. MTTL also suggests that it should give some thought to using 'schlüsselmaedchen' which have proven their value to an extent that even the German General Staff transmitted operational orders to Army Groups by that means. The use of these 'schlüsselmaedchen' would of course have to be confined to transmission between the USSR and the American control transmitter where it is envisaged that in case of capture in such event the whole system would have been given away.

17. For each country AMT VI has a so-called 'Infiltration group' or 'G.S. for Infiltration of Communist Agents ABM II'. It is in this category a group of confidential, full-time agents (Infiltration vertragsleute) in his assigned territory, as a rule German nationals, who then devote themselves to organizing an agent net. As a matter of general policy, the number of full-time agents is being kept down to a minimum compatible with a successful operation of the act. The number increases in countries like Yugoslavia and Bulgaria where the net is spread over the whole country.

18. The chief agents - all told around two dozen in the whole country - have been checked over especially carefully and are without exception close personal confidants of the man who organized the act. In their political leaning these men are anti-Sovietists and their military motive in doing agent work is to see the Hungarian forces of occupation leave the country and Bolshevik influence in the direction of the thirty people eliminated. They are speculating upon anti-invasion tendencies in certain sectors of life, no doubt. MTTL believes that it will take a long time before they will be themselves of that opinion. Aside from that, most of them are still in contact with us and are inclined to view matters basically and do not believe the figures to the extent of believing that their remarks would possibly be responsible in convincing the United States with invading. There is another reason involved in their decision to continue operating; namely that they are committed to Germany's defense most of them are bound to keep fighting for Germany's survival and naturally it would give them a certain feeling of security. From what appears to be working for the most powerful nation in the field, from the data

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of seeing the United States and Soviet Russia drawing closer together would not induce them to turn round and offer their services to the Russians, neither do they have anything to offer to the Russians (there is nothing they know about their American employer), and nor could they use the facilities of a wireless net organized along anti-Nazi lines. In NYTL's opinion the hand agency in each country is proof against turning round.

HUNGARY

19. **SIMON:** Hauptsturmführer Paul SIMON was a confidant of NYTL, fully informed in all organization and technical detail of the instruction, not as well as the political background of NYTL's activities (trips to Switzerland, etc.).

Posted to VI 7 in December 1940 as referent VI 7 2 (Hungary).

March 1944 sent to Budapest as NYTL's adjoint in the Hungary sector.

After the fall of Budapest sent to Sterling where he took charge of transmitter-operations pinball-bitting for INORI.

After American occupation handed NYTL a letter to the local American commander.

SD Hauptsturmführer Joseph DZADOTY  
1938 - Handled secret matters together with NYTL.

Until beginning 1944 with SD Leibnoblitt Vienna.

Transferred to Art VI at NYTL's suggestion.  
Sent to Budapest in March 1944.

Very intelligent with all the advantages and shortcomings of a lawyer.

Knows Hungary well after a stay of almost a year.  
Works with NYTL in the Hungary Sector.

20. Three transmitters were left behind in Budapest, one of which has reported so far. It is that the transmitter which is being operated by the chief of the information net, Mandolyan (see below). Its location is presumably in the Opera Sector. The absence of the remaining two transmitters is probably due to the fact that they were destroyed during the占 of Budapest.

21. **NYTL to Headquarters (see Annex 1)**

(2) a. NYTL, Stefan alias László Major, offices in the Hungarian state station, László utca 4, Diószegi Utca, Szabókör (behind the) Budapest.

NYTL considers him well-versed against detection, because he established for himself a pro-Germanist reputation by supporting imperial Germanists and Jews, helping some of them to get away, at the insistence of NYTL. After the Russians took over, he

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was re-instated in the State Police.

b. Age 30 years, medium stature, hair black, plentiful, combed back. Moustache, dark brown eyes.

c. To send reports of a general political nature concerning important events of the day (not officially announced) provided they have social or economic significance. The aim is to put the information out on the broadest possible basis, drawing upon all political parties and representing all shades of public opinion, so as to guarantee a factual and objective reporting.

d. 9 May 1945, on that day only calling time. STAFFERLING's orders to go off the air complying with an order as American troops occupied Sterling (7 May 1945).

e. No party affiliation. See under a.

2) a. Four times as pre-arranged (see Annex II). Stoyerling went on reception four times a day, whereas the agents were free to choose their working time in accordance with circumstances. In the beginning he used to call once, sometimes twice a week as directed, up to now to examine itself usually. During the last period on UN calls in almost daily, usually around 1630.

b. Messages in Hungarian. 10-15 groups was the limit. Abbreviations in accordance with the International Code. No peculiarities of style.

c. 200 March II. In case of an emergency, a special 'Emergency' had been agreed upon with V/T Operator L. G. SIEK.

3) a. Agents' investigations and findings.

b. In circles of the Hungarian ruling, government, trade and business, labor, communists, liberals and other national opposition.

c. If possible, from all political and social strata on the basis of personal trust, often in accordance with specific directions given over the central transmitter.

4) Good coverage. Microphones required so far utilized a report of the political and communist situation in Budapest. The reliability of microphones has in broad outline been confirmed by listening in.

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TO COMMINT

ALL

NOTT states: This quality has improved considerably of late. E.g. we have already received very interesting information on friction between the government of Miklos and the Russian occupation authorities. In the beginning the reports were held as confidential and contained so many positive things, that at one time we began having our doubts as to whether he still was a free agent. After a long period of time we checked and rechecked his reports until we were satisfied as to their authenticity.

5. a. Just before Germany's collapse an agent with K/T was conveyed across the border via Cracow, for operations in the general area of Warsaw. So far no contact has been established.

b. A K/T operator in Budapest, equipped with two sets (current and history) has been assigned to relieve the line Kedolyas. No contact yet.

6. a. Kedolyas has at his disposal a fund of 20,000 pengo and 5 hundred to offset all expenses including payoffs to soldiers (unless their contributions are voluntary). Further, his expenses have been profound, but have not been reimbursed as yet. Also the same mentioned major job has been given 20,000 pengo and 5 k.pelongo.

b. Kedolyas has directed only in May 1945 to try and maintain contact with the central line office under all circumstances, regardless of changes in the political and military field.

c. Exercised radio in the eastern sector of the CD have taught that the Russians do not believe in the practice of reliable agents. They strictly adhere to a policy of liquidations. The information system as it exists now is a bilateral one, that is to say, chief agent rapporto 116 does not ask any questions, except of a technical kind in connection with transmission. Once the agent starts on his job, there is a great probability that he has been found. Prospects for my organization remain favorable, provided that the latter in the long run, recondition and system.

d. 20 K/T operators have been trained in a school in Hungary during the past six months, eleven of which were shipped to the north (Prague) and in April 1945 in view of the political situation

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(CONT'D) (A)

this could not be done. Only four of them were brought to Odenseburg at the last moment with orders to let them solve by overrun. Until guidelines and frequencies had been agreed upon, these stations have not been called so far. It has been planned to station the remaining 16 operators in the provinces, preferably in their native center of the country. IWTI believes that the procedures are still smooth in Austria and no difficulties should be encountered in setting them up when the principal of the wireless school has been located.

- b. Hungary has a vast untapped reservoir of potential agents and factors amongst its citizens who represent a cross-section of all social classes, political parties, and who, occasionally, have close connections to important personages in the political and in the economic sphere.
- c. The potentialities of the Hungarians must not be judged on the basis of its present performance, but allowance should be made for the fact that EQUITY has only been operating for the three months under very adverse conditions.
- d. Difficulties are bound to arise from the fact that the speed of the American agency has interrupted communications between the various groups and also the Hitler-occupied part of Austria will be all inviolability in practically sealed against outside infiltrations. This latter difficulty might be overcome by motivating a "hit-settoff" in Vienna, taking advantage of local talent, at the same time moving the operation base along to the Hungarian "frontiers."

22. In answer to question 5, IWTI makes the following observation: It would not pay to link up the provincial transmitters with a central relay station inside of Hungary, thereby increasing the chance of detection. As it is planned now, the sub-agents will be multiplied and distributed by the Central Agency in Germany; once they have reached their destination they will try to attach themselves to existing political parties, gather copies to their information material.

BULGARIA 23. S. M. G. S. (Sekretarjatul tuteh Nauk), Tbil, via Reffent in VI E. He will consider him a good organizer and a very good Bulgaria expert. On his qualifications as an intelligence operator just sufficient to be determined. In his capacity as reffent, he was dealing mostly with the evaluation and to a much lesser extent with the procedure of collecting information.

24. Answer to Questionnaire (Answer 3)

1. Chief representative (V. 10/01), chief agent (V. 10/2) and wireless operator (V. 10/03 were interviewed in Tbil by IWTI) are purloined.

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upon leaving Bulgaria in September 1944. As a result the projected transmitters in Sofia, Stip and Central Bulgaria never became operative. The Bulgarian-referat never had agents in the accepted sense of the word. The chief representative (IV) conducted the whole net and leaned for support upon national groups (National, legionaries, Macedonians), who in turn had relations in all political camps and economic circles and through the variety of their connections made up for the unwillingness of the basic organizations. A second representative (V 20/02) was judged in the staff of the Herrmann Tabakery who, under the general supervision of the IV, ran the net, thereby providing possibilities of a counter-espionage. Only very few agents worked consciously for the net and were steered by the IV.

a. Dr. Dimitar TOLLY (V 20/23), lawyer, theoridian.  
Deceased Sept. 1944.

Professor KIRIL KIRILOFF (V 20/17), school teacher,  
Bulgar, leader of the National. Left Bulgaria in September 1944. Last  
address: Bad Alt Aussee.

Christo STATOV alias Zofa, Bulgar, politician (one-  
time leader of the national liberal party) and during King Boris' life-  
time, in charge of the King's private intelligence service. Left Bulgaria  
September 1944. Last address: Alt Aussee.

Athanas NIKOLOV (V 20/07) Bulgar, private, politically  
unattached. Remained in Sofia.

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No should also, HOETTL says, tell CIAUSA that we know about his past activities, including the "illegal" ones.

**38. NOETTL'S MEETING WITH KALTZER AND CO. AT ALEX.**

For two or three days about 20 April 1, there were discussions each day at 110000 with KALTZER and CO. CO. also came for individual meetings with KALTZER and CO. In NOETTL's discussions, he told KALTZER and CO. he would not continue without his approval, and KALTZER and CO., who had previously given no further than a benevolent attitude toward NOETTL's investigations, now permitted NOETTL to act in his name. (NOETTL had in the meantime indoctrinated from SCHWIDLER and KALTZER and CO. a minister, and those two ladies had worked on KALTZER and CO.).

**39. NOETTL-KALTZER MEETING AT OXFORD, 25 APRIL.**

After KALTZER and CO.'s visit to NOETTL at London, he went to Salzburg, where NOETTL saw him again. Also at Salzburg were KALTZER and CO. and KALTZER and CO. had discussions with NOETTL, also Mr. STEINERLEDER, head of sat one of the leading Nazi officers unknown to NOETTL, with his adjutants and members of his III C, were there, and Dr. RODS who came from Bonn being dem. NOETTL does not know the purpose of most of these meetings, and considers that it may have been a matter of people from the KGB reporting at Salzburg.

On this day, KALTZER and CO. discussed possible activities, and KALTZER and CO. ordered KALTZER to collaborate with CO. and KALTZER is their plan to the Germans.

NOETTL recalls a meeting at Strook with CO. and KALTZER and says that KALTZER left Strook for 110000 (about 4/5 PM).

**40. KONTZ, BAYER, and CO. IN STROOK.**

NOETTL recalls that Stanton, CO. and CO. from the KGB known as BOROVSKY, whose HQ was in the Soviet Union at 14400, called unaccompanied on KALTZER at his Q. W. (c. 3 1/2). CO. wanted to discuss his troubles — he had no contact with the Germans; KALTZER could not give him any information, but CO. gave him some lunch. Duoye, assistant CO. was on the phone throughout, but did not have any particular discussion with KALTZER.

NOETTL adds that October 23, 1945 he was in Strook as liaison man with the USSR Partizan forces and was at 14400. He received no reports from KALTZER, and no CO. from KALTZER.

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Ordinarily the Parteikommisari did not forward by handling any of its own information to the RSHA, but it did send opinions re other information it received, e.g. from the Sicherheitspolizei.

41. KULTURKRIEGER'S PLANS FOR CONTINUING HIS ACTIVITY

It was at Strobl, probably c. 3 May, that KULTURKRIEGER discussed a plan that had apparently been on his mind recently. He told HOCHSTETL that he would undoubtedly be on the list of S.S. ordinaries, since he was SS; he wanted HOCHSTETL to tell him his plans that he had been cooperating with HOCHSTETL's group, and that he would the Americans that he might help; he intended himself to go to the mountains, to make contact there with the illegal leaders of National Socialism, who were who also said would be in the mountains, and through whom he could contact the Nazi remnants elsewhere in Austria.

He adduced the example of the Austrian Nazis in 1937/38, who had carried on a similar illegal movement, while he and KULTURKRIEGER openly represented their movement in negotiations with the Government of Austria. He wanted once again to do this, with the knowledge of the new Austrian Government; and he had discussed the plan with GLAISER and J.U. WILHELM; LU WILHELM told KULTURKRIEGER they were to pass on the plan to the members of the new Government.

KULTURKRIEGER, HOCHSTETL thinks, had discussed the plan with RAUHNER, and possibly with other Gauleiters; but he intended to rely on his contacts rather on the level following reprimanded by the Gauleiters. He did this primarily because he was highest in rank of the SS in Austria, and because he felt also he could count on his SS people. HOCHSTETL does not know whom he had in mind. HOCHSTETL says he intended to set up 1/2 and one-half communications, but had none available at the time.

42. KULTURKRIEGER'S PART IN THE RESISTANCE

Though KULTURKRIEGER thus lacked communications, HOCHSTETL already had a network prepared, with 1/2 main and middle in Styria, Salzburg, and Ober-Oesterreich, with no. 20 of 111 closest circle in charge — Hargreaves and others — in the process, perhaps 100 in all. SHADWELL intended to go to the mountains also. He was not present when this network was formed, and HOCHSTETL does not know whether he was involved in it or not. HOCHSTETL regards that KULTURKRIEGER was not involved by KULTURKRIEGER. He regards that KULTURKRIEGER was not involved politically, and told HOCHSTETL that he differed with KULTURKRIEGER politically, with him (probably because of KULTURKRIEGER's political influence, not his unreliability).

The only persons with whom KULTURKRIEGER organized to go to the mountains were SCHILLER, the Vienna chemist,

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and a porous man WAGLER (?).

43. FURTHER ON KARL WAGLER'S VISIT/SIGNATURE

In rechecking this information, HOHTTL said he thought HUGO BACHMANN and KARL WAGLER had discussed the plans for Hitler's local activity. KARL WAGLER had no hideout place in mind as a hideout in the mountains, and no communions rarely (except with C.W.L.W.'s help). After KARL WAGLER went to Austria, on 5 May, HOHTTL thinks he had no contacts with his leaders; he knows only of the visit from KARL WAGLER from April 1940, to report that KARL WAGLER would not oppose surrender in Austria.

44. PLANNING OF THE ROME ANT VI

HOHTTL knows nothing of any plan to split the army into a Northern and a Southern section (cf. Subquestion of HOHTTL 100-111111-11). KARL WAGLER had already organized the feasibility of getting the Austrian members to the South, had opposed moving Ant VI to Salzburg near WADDECK, and in fact had worked out the separation of VI B and VI S from the rest of Ant VI — a plan of which little came, except that at least the rest of Ant VI did not come down.

45. PLANS FOR MICROFILMING DOCUMENTS

VI F had plans, and in fact orders were apparently given, in 1943, for micro-filming Ant VI documents, on the initiative of SCHEIBELLENGER. Not more than a small portion of the documents were microfilmed. HOHTTL does not know of similar plans for other areas.

46. DR. JUNK

KARL WAGLER's contacts with JUNK were good personal ones, especially from the period 1937/38. JUNK was not influential into the Austrian plans. Prince ROMANOWSKI to JUNK, and HOHTTL met him at Salzburg, but felt it was too late to approach JUNK in this matter.

47. THE FEDERAL BASE

KAYA, an American parachutist captured by the Germans, was used by GRILLER HOHTTL as a contact man with the FEDERAL BASE (Social Democrats and Christian Socialists). Specifically, HOHTTL does not know the leaders of this movement; however, if it were to go via KAYA to glorified means, probably to the new Headquarters of Tyrol, Innsbruck.

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HOLTTI got KALTENBRUNN's approval, from Utrohl, of having HEYER -- KALTENBRUNN sent on order to this effect in the State Innsbruck through the State Salzburg (and HOLTTI kept him from so holding HEYER across the Alpine border).

Another American, a W/T operator, might mention and long since in prison, got out with HEYER. He was never held in jail, but was well hidden. HOLTTI knows of no documents made by HEYER with the Americans while he was in Innsbruck.

48. WILHELM HEYER CASE: ESTIMATE

HOLTTI says that Captain Dr. HALLER of the Alpine Innsbruck offered to turn over an American W/T operator who had been caught earlier, to help HEYER make W/T contacts. HALLER was an old Austrian state police officer, from Salzburg or Styria, who had been appointed at Innsbruck, as an Austrian, by KALTENBRUNN, who was tired of the responsibilities of Salzburg in such positions in Austria.

In the night of 2/3 May, some one said that Gaertner, (not known to HOLTTI) came to HALLER to ask whether there were any plans for liquidating prisoners before the Americans arrived. HALLER thinks this person was not a representative of HEYER, but says that he was not recommending, or bringing up the conception, the killing of prisoners, but simply asking information. HALLER told this man that nothing of the sort was intended by him.

49. BONNAU'S DISCLOSURE

Though BONNAU was mostly in Berlin, in liaison with all his Discipleship, the last of it was in Innsbruck. HOLTTI knew this, besides KALTENBRUNN, Ministerialrat Dr. KREBS, in charge of church matters, a fog, of course, of the church.

50. RAHNER W/T SCHOOL

RAHNER was director of this school, which was to train in place for W/T personnel for the 213 planes -- first G-100, later K-100. Fifteen operators were to be trained but this plan was released and told to go to another-purposed location. RAHNER does not know whether the four W/T operators who were being trained there for him were actually used; they were given to him as if it was to keep them, but they may not have gone to the other location. The operation was to be dropped behind the British lines, but he does not know where they were to be.

51. HEYER

HEYER was incompetent, and strictly a police nature. He

in past years KALTBACHEN had tried to dismiss him, but KIRCHHORN had protected him; finally in February 1945 he was replaced by KOCHLICH. KOCHLICH was fond of GERMANY, and kept him for certain matters dealing with Hungary; he also took him to Berlin in April with the intention of making him go there. HOFFMANN does not know what became of KOCHLICH after that.

GARRETT had been in charge of the State (or possibly B3) in Pragow, had been tough in suppressing Czech underground activities in 1942-43, and once boasted to Hoffmann that he had been concerned to death by the Czech underground. GARRETT went to Hungary in March 1944 (the German occupation), on FISCHER's instructions; when FISCHER was recalled, GARRETT became head of Hungary.

HOFFMANN says that GARRETT always carried out orders, and got on well with his superiors. GARRETT was a man in no conciliatory mood.

52. KNOCHLICH

KNOCHLICH was to be Inspector of Art. VI, mainly, HOFFMANN thinks, because ALTMAYER wanted a check on KNOCHLICH. KNOCHLICH stalled, insisted that KNOCHLICH make report of Art. VI to become thoroughly acquainted with it, and then proceed to work; at its end, KNOCHLICH was appointed to Hungary, and so actually never did the active work of Inspectorate. He used to study the whole office, including, HOFFMANN thinks, the will, Art. current changes etc. This was about the turn of 1944/45.

Because of his failure in Pragow, his premature departure from there, HOFFMANN demanded that he be punished, but KALTBACHEN stalled off KNOCHLICH's transfer to the USSR until November, until finally it was possible to put in effect an Inspection.

53. UD AND ASSAULTS WITH THE ARMED

The set of 31 Commandants -- living in Slovakia, HUNGARY in Budapest, KALTBACHEN in Budapest, BUDAPEST, and KOCHELY in Szeged -- who had been installed almost simultaneously as envelope, and of whom it was feared that they would bring the administration down in their way, turned out to be rather ineffective. So the SD had to take over and run down commandants with the nationally minded groups in those regions. With J. C. and the SD they acted co-operated well. The other envelope stayed at police stations, and maintained the old parliamentary influence on their local districts.

As the Russians advanced the Hungarian Red Army at the necessary to radio info of the "national" groups, these efforts were made in Bulgaria in July 1944 in order with the Russians.

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(KREMERATION) and the Legionnaires group (NATIONAL), but it was tried only at the last moment, and too late. The secret part of attempt was made with the Iron Guard in Hungary in August, with the same result. In Hungary, on the other hand, U.S. INTELLIGENCE wanted to co-operate only with the existing leader of M.P., the Arrow Cross. In Greece, USINACHER and LUDOVIC worked successfully with the National Guards.

As the Balkans were gradually occupied by the Nazis, new "National" governments were formed, and it became clear that the SD enjoyed the confidence of those groups, on the Hungarian side did not. The SD continued to maintain its liaison relation with the governments.

The Auswartiges Amt had little to do with anti-Soviet resistance; operations of that sort were handled by the D.I. HOFFMANN knows of no cases of the Auswartiges Amt's participation in such operations with the SD.

On the other hand, he says that the SD, at all work in conjunction with the Auswartiges Amt. In any case, the Auswartiges Amt people were to supply the official line of policy, not guide the activities.

#### 54. HUSNACHER AND THE CIVIL POLICY

HUSNACHER worked for months to bring together the three main groups in Serbia; the official RADO government, which tried to cooperate; the very pro-German Comitee Vojvodina Carso, under JUVOLIC; and the strongest group, that of KNEZLOVIC, which had fought against the Germans, but, when Anglo-American import was switched to Tito, turned to collaboration with the Germans. HUSNACHER tried to work with the Marxist representative Col. BAGIĆ, who was with KNEZLOVIC.

#### 55. G. VITALE AND NIKOLAI

These leaders of the New Church were asked to go to Moscow through HUSNACHER, with the blessing of the I.D.A. and the SD, because of the danger so that if they did not face, and the hope that they would be acceptable on the grounds of their activities in the west, since they had close ties to Yugoslav revolutionaries to the Nazis, and had been long living in the German camps.

They were to leave for Switzerland at the end of April. HOFFMANN discussed this with LUDOVIC, who says he understood that NIKOLAI had a high reputation in the United States, where he had given lectures.

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## 56. VISZKAYA

VISZKAYA's position under the Hungarian Government in relation to Hungary was like that of ATTILA and HADIK in relation to other Balkan Governments, except that the Hungarian Government did not become an exile government until after late.

## 57. THE ROLE OF THE JUGOSLAVIA IN INSTITUTIONS

NO.211 repeats that VISZKAYA had received a letter from HITLER in the later summer of 1944 to organize an all-European resistance movement (gesamt-europaeische Widerstandsbewegung), the immediate horrors of which would be the Balkans, which would take no contact with the national resistance movements, which had in the meantime become the Balkan governments-in-exile. Apparently this last phrase should not be taken too literally; NO.211 went on to say that VISZKAYA worked with the national groups as represented in the Jugoslovakia, not with the governments and that VISZKAYA did not collaborate with the Hungarian and Czechoslovak, such as ATTILA'S.

SAYKAYA's contacts were accordingly with the native groups in the east, e.g. with MILOSEV, DIMITRIJEVIC, KARLOVIC, etc., while the Hungarians and people were in contact with the governments corresponding to those persons. At first, VISZKAYA worked with the Yugoslav government and maintained Augsburg-like contact with the French government in exile.

NO.211 says there was a Yugoslav Italian, collaborating with the Fascist movement, but he does not know the name of the leader.

## 58. ORGANIZATION OF RESISTANCE IN THE BALKANS

A report received in April by the interpreter, based on information from NO.211, was then distributed. This report stated that VISZKAYA would head the military side of an all-European resistance movement, with a similar setup to be carried over throughout Europe, with political direction to be given by ATTILA, HADIK, and VASAGYI, and the operation of the movement in different countries under the leadership of each person as NO.211 is writing, etc.

The report went on to say that, on the military side, the SS and the Adehr would be directly responsible for the command and direction of resistance.

NO.211 now says that a) the plan for organization in 1943 resulted in the belief that a great war would continue, one occurring in 1945 or 1946, while the population was civilized up

operating during the war — and that he was asked to discuss openly the prospect of possible resistance groups that would have implied the possibility that Germany might lose; (b) the role of Skorzeny and his Jagdverband in the resistance noted appears to have been reported correctly (cf. para. 10 and 13 of this interrogation report), except that WOTTL indicates now that the number of 100,000 men under Skorzeny, given in the April report, was exaggerated; (c) the disorganization of the underground unit had nothing to do with the resistance plans (cf. paras. 6 and 7 above); (d) the operation of the commando for the different countries under such persons as HOHOLKA was correct.

WOTTL says that the Jagdverband did no further than preparatory work — training agents, laying down codes, making of preparations, preparing assassination, etc.

#### 59. SKORENBY'S ASSASSINATION PLANS

SKORENBY had a special type of "Klaubingangskommando" for small-scale operations, for which men were trained in special schools, separately from the Jagdverband, and instructed in assassination, special demolition work, etc. WOTTL says that one attempt at long range was made by members trained thus.

#### 60. UNPOLITICAL NATURE OF THE JAGDVÄRND

WOTTL, relying in part on WILHELM INFORMATION, believes on the unpolitical nature of the Jagdverband (i.e., that subversives played practically no role in the planned action). He points out that the Jagdverband operations were to be carried out with military means, in expectation of a grand German uprising in 1944/45. The Jagdverband people cared little for the war effort, the struggle, and cared little about rebellion. One exception is mentioned is the SD JUNKERS, leader of Jagdverband Alsace.

Jagdverband leader SCHLUCH in Croatia (this man's cover name was KUNZI), and he was apparently a former member previously as a Hitler-Gest member with SD, SS, USTV, and as the resistance movement in Croatia, who planned mainly for a post-war resistance activity in the Punjab.

In Yugoslavia and Albania, the Jagdverband failed to join with nationalist parties (a type similar to the CPUSA, especially strong in Serbia and Bulgaria). The Jagdverband did not employ V-men to make contact with anti-fascist organizations, while the SD would carry on the information activities.

61. VI 1 AS POLITICAL DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

MONTI once again referred to the agreement made with VI 3 by which VI 1 had to approve any political experience of VI 3. He now adds that facilitating a people (including II without) also had to get the approval of VI 4 (MILIT). Usually the procedure was for the competent person in facilitating a group or in the Jard-verbaude to talk over the plans with the competenturat in VI 31 there was little formal handling of such matters.

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